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Abstract: The article studies how changes in 2007 in the Swedish unemployment 
insurance (UI) have influenced employees’ turnover cognitions. It is argued that the 
combination of a strict employment protection legislation (EPL) and a generous UI in 
2006 made employees more inclined to risky transitions. The post-2007 combination 
of a strict EPL and an ungenerous UI reinforces non-mobility intentions. Analyses of 
two surveys show a smaller proportion of employees with turnover cognitions in 2010 
than in 2006.
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cognitions.
Resumen: El artículo estudia cómo los cambios de 2007 en el subsidio de desempleo 
sueco ha influenciado en las turnover cognitions (la percepción de los empleados en 
relación a la movilidad laboral). Se argumenta que la combinación de una legislación 
estricta que protege el empleo y un generoso subsidio de desempleo en 2006 hizo que los 
empleados se tomaran más riesgos a la hora de cambiar de empresa. Tras la reforma 
de 2007 que combinó una protección estricta del empleo con un subsidio de desempleo 
poco generoso se reforzó la falta de movilidad de los empleados. Los resulados de las 
encuestas muestran una menor proporción de empleados con turnover cognitions en 
2010 que en 2006.
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1. Introduction
Sweden has long been renowned for its mix of labour market policies (LMPs), 
specifically its relatively generous unemployment insurance and extensive use of 
active labour market measures (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Amable, 2003; Gallie, 
2007). In this regard, Swedish employees have enjoyed a high level of security 
when faced with unemployment. The unemployment insurance (UI) decreases 
income reduction in the case of unemployment and active measures facilitate the 
return to employment. Furthermore, Sweden has relatively strict employment 
protection legislation (EPL), especially for regular employees, which results in 
high levels of job security.
However, since the 2006 election of the right-wing/centre government (re-
elected in 2010), Swedish LMPs have undergone radical changes. The UI has 
become much less generous and covers fewer employees and active measures have 
been reduced. In combination with other measures, this can be described as a 
change from a ‘high road’ to a ‘low road’ policy in the search for full employment 
(Bengtsson and Berglund, 2012). On the other hand, the government has been 
careful not to touch the EPL, arguing that it does not affect the employment rate, 
which is a key concern. In general, the government wants to keep the Swedish 
industrial relations model intact (that is, to protect the central importance of 
collective bargaining).
However, rapid changes in the institutional framework of labour markets can 
be risky, as theories of ‘Institutional Complementarities’ have shown (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Höpner, 2005; Aoki, 2007; Hall and Gingerich, 
2009). These theories assert that the institutional influence on actors can be 
reinforced by the combination of institutions. This also implies that if the parts 
of an institutional system are changed, positive complementarities can be lost 
and negative side effects can occur.
The present article argues that the altered institutional setting in Sweden 
has affected employees’ turnover cognitions (that is, their preferences regarding 
job-to-job mobility). The Swedish employment protection legislation makes it 
possible to ‘invest’ in job protection through tenure. Therefore, the EPL may 
reduce employees’ willingness to change jobs. However, this tendency can be 
counteracted by a generous unemployment insurance, which compensates 
for some of the security lost when making transitions between jobs (that is, 
the risk of becoming unemployed because of a failed transition). One possible 
consequence of the altered unemployment insurance is that employees become 
less inclined to make risky transitions and instead try to retain their present 
job. This hypothesis is tested using two surveys. The first survey was conducted 
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before the institutional changes had taken place and the second after the major 
changes to the unemployment insurance.
The article is structured as follows. It starts by discussing the significance of 
the EPL and the UI for job mobility. Then the EPL and the UI in Sweden are 
introduced and the changes that have taken place in these areas are discussed. 
The next section discusses institutional theories with a focus on institutional 
complementarities and presents some hypotheses about changes in employees’ 
turnover cognitions as a consequence of institutional changes in Sweden. Then 
the data are presented, the analytical strategy described and the results outlined. 
The paper ends with a discussion of the findings and possible upcoming 
institutional changes regarding the EPL and the UI if low mobility figures are 
recognized as a political problem.
2. Turnover cognitions and the significance of 
employment protection legislation and unemployment 
insurance
This article focuses on employees’ turnover cognitions: that is, their thoughts 
about changing employer (Sager, Griffeth and Hom, 1998). Within the 
organisational psychological literature, this willingness has also been interpreted 
as ‘withdrawal cognitions’ (Tett and Meyer, 1993). The most central antecedents 
for these cognitions are job satisfaction and organisational commitment, but job 
insecurity has also been shown to be related to turnover cognitions (Berglund, 
2007). Furthermore, research has established significant relationships between 
turnover cognitions and actual quits (Griffeth et alii, 2000; Hom and Kinicki, 
2001).
The empirical connection to actual mobility is an argument for the potential 
importance of turnover cognitions. An overview of the significance of labour 
market mobility is offered in the OECD’s Employment Outlook 2010 (p. 173ff ). 
From a macro perspective, mobility has been shown to be related to productivity 
growth, in that a fluid labour market facilitates the growth of productive sectors 
of the economy. However, OECD warns of excessive mobility, which can hamper 
the accumulation of firm-specific human capital, such as on-the-job training. 
From the perspective of individual workers, changing jobs may also have some 
positive consequences. Job-to-job mobility may serve as a way to find a suitable 
match between individual job preferences and an actual job. Furthermore, 
voluntary job mobility has been found to correlate with wage gains.
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The purpose of the present analysis is to go beyond the immediate 
organisational environment and focus on the influence that the institutional 
context of the EPL and the UI has on turnover cognitions. Research on the EPL 
has mostly concentrated on the expected behaviour of the employer. In this vein, 
the strictness of the legislation is believed to affect employers’ dismissals and 
hiring decisions (Skedinger, 2008; OECD, 2010). In the first case, the legislation 
usually includes rules of notice and priority orders, which restrict employers’ 
opportunities to decide who to fire and when. This may make employers more 
careful when deciding who to hire. As a consequence of these two mechanisms, 
stricter EPL can slow mobility rates (especially involuntary mobility). However, 
the legislation may also affect the voluntary mobility intentions of employees. 
The rules regarding notice and priority usually build upon seniority or tenure, 
which makes it possible for employees to invest in protection. Consequently, if 
a regular employee has invested in protection through tenure, this may make 
that employee more hesitant to change jobs and lose protection (Furåker and 
Berglund, 2009; OECD, 2010).
The UI can also influence employees’ mobility cognitions. The UI is generally 
believed to affect the search efforts and reservation wages of unemployed people 
(Layard, Nickell och Jackman 1991; OECD, 2010). However, the UI can also 
have more general effects. The UI is a kind of collective risk sharing, which 
reduces the negative economic impact of unemployment (Schmid, 2008). This, 
in turn, can make employees more prepared for risky job transitions and more 
willing to change jobs (Boone, 2004; Sjöberg, 2008).
Empirically, there is some support for these hypotheses on the effects that 
the EPL and the UI have on turnover cognitions. In an analysis of 1997 data 
from 18 countries, Souza-Posa and Henneberger (2004) found a significant 
negative relationship between the strictness of EPL and turnover intentions. In 
a multilevel analysis of 14 EU countries, Sjöberg (2008) also found a negative 
relationship between EPL and mobility intentions. Furthermore, a positive 
relationship was found between the generosity of the UI and mobility intentions.
3. Employment protection legislation and 
unemployment insurance in Sweden 
This section describes the Swedish EPL and UI in greater detail. The Swedish 
Employment Protection Act (Lagen om Anställningsskydd, LAS) dates back to 
1974, and has three cornerstones: contracts of employment (duration), objective 
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grounds for dismissal, and order of priority in connection with termination of 
employment (Bylund and Viklund, 2006; Furåker, 2006; Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 2010: 235-38). In the normal case, employment contracts are open-
ended and fixed-term contracts are regarded as an exception to the rule. Since then 
the rules regarding fixed-term contracts have been liberalised. The last change 
took place in 2007 and abolished a rule allowing a maximum of five temporary 
contracts per employee. Employees are now allowed an unlimited number.
Another key component of the Employment Protection Act is that notice 
of termination, which must always be given in writing, must also be based on 
objective grounds. Shortage of work is generally considered a legitimate cause 
for dismissal. Furthermore, employers are obliged to give notice in advance of 
redundancy and/or dismissal. The order of priority stipulates that employees 
with longer times of employment are entitled to longer periods of notice (Bylund 
and Viklund, 2006; Furåker and Berglund, 2009). The minimum period is one 
month for employees with less than two years of employment and increases 
gradually to a maximum of six months for employees with more than 10 years 
of employment. Workers who have been laid off have a prioritised right to re-
employment at their previous workplace.
A third component of the law is the order of priority for collective dismissals. 
In accordance with the ‘last in, first out’ principle, employees who have been in 
employment longest have priority over other employees in cases of redundancy. 
In 2000–2001, the Swedish Parliament made another amendment to the law, 
stipulating that an employer with a maximum of 10 employees is allowed to 
exempt from this priority order a maximum of two employees who the employer 
considers to be of particular importance to the company. 
It is important to emphasize the fact that the EPL in Sweden is semi-optional: 
that is, it can be revised both upwards and downwards by collective agreements 
(Bylund and Viklund, 2006). The rules of objective grounds for dismissal in 
the Employment Protection Act are not negotiable, whereas the rules regarding 
contracts of employment (duration) and order of priority in connection with 
layoffs are open for negotiation. In a study by the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprises (Svenskt Näringsliv) —the main employers organization—, it 
was found that 36 percent of Swedish companies that had made redundancies 
had made exceptions to the priority rules after negotiations with the unions 
(Rudeberg and Ingelskog, 2011: 124).
Figure 1 shows OECD’s indices on employment protection legislation 
for 2003 and 2008. The overall indices suggest that Swedish legislation was 
liberalised between these two years. However, closer examination of the figures 
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reveals that the change is due to liberalisation in the use of temporary employees. 
Looking at the rules for regular employees and collective dismissals, there have 
been no changes since 2003. This means that the rules of ‘first in, last out’ and 
time of notice are intact.
Figure 1. Employment protection legislation 2003 and 2008. 
OECD’s indices. Version 2.
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Modern unemployment insurance was introduced in Sweden 1974, the same 
year as LAS (see Bengtsson & Berglund, 2012). Since then, however, the UI has 
been changed several times – mostly in the direction of a less generous UI. The 
generosity of the insurance can be assessed by looking at the rules of qualification, 
the duration of benefits and the level of compensation. However, these rules may 
also be significant for the coverage of the insurance, (that is, if people believe it is 
worth being a member).
When the modern UI was established, the rules of qualification included a 
membership and a work requirement (SO, 2008). The membership requirement 
involved paying a fee for at least 12 months and the work requirement required a 
working period of at least 75 days in five months (four months from 1989) over a 
12-month period. In the 1990s, the work requirement became stricter, and it was 
sharpened even further in 2007 by the right-wing/centre coalition government 
requiring at least 80 hours per month within six of the last 12 months. In the 
same year, the government also changed the insurance membership fees. The 
increase was quite dramatic for employed members: from a mean of 99 SEK a 
month (range 84–120 SEK) in 2006 to a mean of 344 SEK (range 240–415) in 
2007 (SO, 2007). The unemployment insurance funds are connected to unions 
that organize members in different industries (the so-called Ghent system). The 
purpose of the increase was to change the unemployment insurance into a more 
‘normal’ insurance, in which the fees mirrored the risk of being unemployed in 
different industries.
The possible duration of the unemployment benefit has not changed a great 
deal since 1974. The benefit usually applies for 300 days, after which a new 
work requirement must be fulfilled. Until 2001, however, some of the active 
labour market programmes qualified as a new work requirement. This was 
then abolished, together with the entitlement of older workers to have a longer 
duration (450 days for people aged 55 and over; 57 since 1998). However, it 
became possible to have the benefit extended for an additional 300 days without 
fulfilling an extra work requirement. In 2007, this option was removed and the 
maximum was set at 300 days (except for unemployed people with a child under 
18 years, who were entitled to 450 days). The insurance also involved a waiting 
period before the benefit was paid. Initially, this period was six days; the waiting 
period was then removed in 1989 but reintroduced in 1993 at five days. In 2008, 
this was increased to seven days.
The payment levels have decreased steadily since the introduction of the 
insurance. Prior to 1993, the insurance covered 90 percent of the prior wage 
(91.7 percent until 1987). Then the compensation level decreased to 80 percent. 
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The level of compensation remained stable (except for the year 1996 with a 
75 percent payment level) until 2007, when the right-wing/centre coalition 
government changed the rules again. For the first 200 days, the compensation is 
80 percent, and 70 percent thereafter until day 300. If the unemployed person 
is re-qualified to start a new period, the compensation will be 65 percent. Apart 
from the compensation level, the unemployment insurance also has a maximum 
amount; a so-called ‘ceiling’. This number has not increased since 2002, despite 
increases in income. Between 1998 and 2006, approximately 40–50 percent 
of former full-timers were compensated for up to 80 percent of their wages. In 
2010, only 12 percent received 80 percent of their former wages (SO 2010). 
However, the development of an unemployment insurance that does not 
fully compensate its members has created an incentive for unions to bargain for 
collective supplementary compensations and offer group insurances through 
the membership fee (Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö 2011). Many employees 
in the Swedish labour market therefore have supplementary insurances for 
salaries above the ceiling. It is not allowed, however, to have insurances that 
compensate for more than the maximum level in the public insurance and most 
supplementary insurances do not pay for the whole 300 day period. Furthermore, 
complementary insurances are less widespread among blue-collar than among 
white-collar union members.
Figure 2. Net replacement rates of initial phase of unemployment 
for two family types with average wage. 
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A final factor to take into account is the proportion of the labour force covered 
by the UI (IAF and own calculations). In 1990, the UI had 3,556,000 members, 
which represented approximately 78 percent of the labour force. During the 
economic recession in the early 1990s, the number of members increased by 
about 250,000 and then stabilized. In 2006, there were 3,779,000 members, or 
82 percent of the labour force. Within one year, however, approximately 390,000 
members had left the insurance, which then covered 73 percent of the workforce. 
The decline continued until 2009. Mostly the youngest and the oldest members 
withdrew from the insurance, as did low-income groups (Kjellberg, 2010).
Figure 2 presents OECD figures on the replacement rate to provide a further 
indication of how the generosity of the UI has changed. The figure indicates 
the average income before an unemployment spell that is replaced by the 
unemployment benefit in the initial phase of unemployment. For a two-earner 
family, the example applies for one spouse losing their job and the other continuing 
to work full time with earnings equal to 67 percent of the average income. 
However, the drops in generosity since 2007 are significant for both family types. 
In fact, in 2010 Sweden was ranked 24th for single earner families and 26th for a 
two earner family out of 32 OECD countries comparing replacement rates. The 
Swedish ranking in 2006 was 10th and 15th out of 31 OECD countries.
This overview of the two main institutions under discussion, the EPL and 
the UI, shows quite dramatic changes in the UI but much more continuity in the 
EPL. Between 2006 and 2010, the UI became much less generous, implementing 
stricter work requirements and longer waiting periods, strengthening the 
demands for search activity, lowering the compensation rate, not increasing the 
level of the ‘ceiling’ (despite income increases), and imposing higher membership 
fees. One possible consequence of these changes is increased income insecurity 
in the case of unemployment. There have been some changes in the EPL, which 
concern temporary employees but not regular employees. Among the latter 
category, no great changes in job insecurity related to the EPL are therefore to 
be expected. However, there is a risk of a general increase in job insecurity if the 
use of temporaries becomes widespread in the labour market as a consequence of 
the 2007 liberalization, although no such tendencies have yet been seen (in 2006, 
the share of temporary employment was 17 percent; in 2010 it was 15 percent).
4. Theories of institutional complementarities
The change in the Swedish institutional system is an interesting case from 
the perspective of institutional theories. In particular, theories of so-called 
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institutional complementarities may be of importance to understand the possible 
effects and side effects of the comprehensive changes that have taken place.
Before proceeding, it is important to define the concept of institution. 
Theoretically, it is common to differentiate between three «New Institutionalisms» 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). These traditions involve great similarities in the 
definitions of institutions, although the scope of the presumed significance and 
influence on actors varies. The most restricted understanding is found in rational-
choice or economic institutionalism. For example, Douglas North (1991: 97) 
defined institutions as human devices that constrain political, economic and social 
interaction. Institutions are ‘the rules of the game’, making human interaction 
more predictable and lowering transaction costs. However, human preferences 
and values are understood to be exogenous of the institutional context (although 
there are exceptions to this view, for example, Aoki (2007)). A more inspiring 
view of institutions is found in the so-called sociological institutionalism. Here, 
constraints are not only related to informal and formal rules. Instead, actors’ 
entire understanding of an action situation is affected by the symbols, cognitive 
schemata, or more general frames of meaning that are made available by the 
institutional (and cultural) structures. In this way, actors’ values and preferences 
become endogenous from the institutional context. A third perspective is known 
as historical institutionalism. This involves both ‘calculus’ approaches, which 
stress how institutions structure strategic interactions, and ‘cultural’ approaches, 
which empasize that institutions are part of the culture that, in a pervasive way, 
influences actors’ identities and preferences.
Other differences between the three institutionalisms are related to the 
evolution of institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In the rational-choice or 
economist vision, institutions have evolved as solutions or equilibriums of play-
theoretical dilemmas. Therefore, institutions can be regarded as having a rational 
foundation, although sub-optimal solutions are frequent. The sociological view, 
on the other hand, is that the institutional setting is more contingent in relation 
to the interactions that it constrains. Other processes of cultural traditions, 
social acceptance and political legitimacy are involved, which make ‘suboptimal 
solutions’ to interactions the rule rather than the exception (March and Olsen, 
1989). The historical institutional perspective underlines power and conflict in 
the creation of institutional orders and the role of institutions in the distribution 
of power. 
However, institutional orders have a tendency to create ‘path dependency’: 
that is, the institutional setting carries the historical development in a distinct 
direction. In the discussions of institutional paths and regimes, ‘institutional 
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complementarities’ has emerged as an important concept. It refers to the combined 
influence that different institutions have on actors’ behaviour (Campbell, 2011). 
Hall and Soskice (2001: 17) asserted that institutional complementarities exist 
‘...if the presence (or efficiency) of one [institution] increases the returns from (or 
efficiency of ) the other’. In other words, the outcomes affected by an institution 
are reinforced if another complementary institution is present (see also Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009). Aoki (2007) described institutional linkages and institutional 
complementarities. In the first case, institutions from different domains may 
reinforce actors’ action plans and strategic interactions as they benefit from 
adjusting their actions to institutions in combination rather than in isolation. 
Institutional complementarities are linkages between institutions where the 
presence of a certain combination of institutions is more beneficial for the actors 
than another combination.
In a review of the theories of institutional complementarities, Höpner 
(2005) points out three implications (see also Amable 2009). Firstly, it may be 
misleading to focus on a single institution when trying to understand their effects. 
Secondly, complementarities may restrain institutional change, but sudden 
changes can have unintended effects. Thirdly, there may be constraints connected 
to implementing institutional innovations from outside an institutional system. 
Therefore, institutional paths can be understood as an effect of institutions that 
are complementary to each other, creating incentives that reinforce certain actions 
and interactions. It may be difficult to break with the path because of suboptimal 
outcomes (in the short run) and the occurrence of unintended side effects.
5. A theoretical framework
This article uses the following definition of institutions by Hall and Soskice (2001: 
9) as a guideline: ‘... we define institutions as a set of rules, formal or informal, that 
actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons …’ 
However, the distinction made by Jürgen Habermas (1995: 17–22) regarding 
how actors understand action-situations makes it reasonable not to circumscribe 
the definition of the action-situation only to material interests, and normative 
and cognitive components. Instead, material interests should be understood from 
the more general viewpoint of preferences or values. Institutions, therefore, are 
formal or informal rules that make certain action-outcomes more probable than 
others because the institutions influence and constrain the cognitions, values and 
norms that are reasonable in the action situation. Cognitions are actors’ beliefs 
about what exists (facts) and are related (for example, causal relations) in the 
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situation: that is, they are the fundaments for action-plans. Values have to do 
with what is worthwhile or preferred in the situation: that is, they are evaluated 
action-goals. Norms are actors’ judgements about which types of actions are 
socially acceptable in the situation and which ones are not (that is, actions that 
deserve sanctions).
Table 1. A schema of perceptions connected to labour market institutions
EPL UI
Cognitions
(facts, action plans, strategy)
Assessment of job 
security
Assessment of income 
security
Values (evaluated goals or 
preferences)
The perceived value of job 
security 
The perceived value of 
income protection 
Norms (appropriate actions and 
legitimizations)
The social 
appropriateness of 
dismissals/mobility
The social appropriateness of 
living on the UI
Table 1 shows a schematic picture of possible perceptions connected to the 
institutions that the article focused on. To be useful in the first place, the schema 
must be delimited to a certain actor; in the present case, the perspective of 
employees. It is important to underline that the theoretical perspective advocated 
here does not assume that the particular institutional setting described accounts 
for all the variations in actors’ perceptions; there are many other important 
factors. For example, with regard to employees’ assessment of job security, factors 
such as the business cycle and type of employment contract are both important 
(De Witte, 2005).
However, some variation in perceptions is, ceteris paribus, believed to be 
influenced by the institution in question. Furthermore, the cognitions, values and 
norms connected with an institution are expected to be coherent to some degree, 
at least when an institution is stable and on an aggregate level. One reason for 
this is a general psychological tendency to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957; Schmidt, 2010). Therefore, the possible action repertoire may tend to 
converge around strategies, goals and norms that can be achieved and upheld. 
However, if instability occurs, the coherence in perceptions may dissolve.
In line with theories of institutional complementarities, institutions should 
not be viewed in isolation when attempting to understand their influence on 
actors. Instead, combinations of institutions are of great significance. However, 
the concept of ‘complementarity’ is not used in a value-neutral sense but tends 
to imply a positive (economic) outcome of some kind. In this regard, it can be 
appropriate to ask ‘complementary for what and for whom?’ (cf. Hall, 2005). 
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As the present article focuses on employees’ turnover cognitions, it is fair to 
ask whether voluntary labour market mobility is good or bad. In general, some 
degree of labour market dynamics is believed to be positive for structural 
transformation in the economy, and also at an individual level for the possibility 
of suitable matches between subjective preferences and available jobs (cf. OECD, 
2010). However, overly high turnover rates may create instability on a company 
level (loss of competencies, high costs for recruitment). 
Another question is related to the mechanisms involved with creating 
complementarities. In most cases, the mechanisms are associated with 
reinforced incentives for certain (positive) actions by the institutions in 
combination (Amable, 2003: 54ff ). However, Crouch (2010: 118ff ) argues that 
complementarities can also arise through compensational mechanisms. In this 
regard, the incentives and self-interest reinforced by some institutions may not 
establish sustainable institutional systems; in some cases, they may even be self-
destructive (see Campbell’s 2011 analysis of the 2008 financial collapse in the 
US). In these cases, institutions that counterbalance such effects may be regarded 
as complementary.
However, the perspective of ‘compensational institutions’ is not particularly 
value-neutral and may imply functionalism. In order to overcome these obstacles, 
this paper will describe the relations between combinations of institutions as 
reinforcing or counteracting (‘non-related’ is also a possible empirical finding). 
Following the above discussion, institutions are believed to influence actors’ 
action plans through structuring the cognitions, values and norms that are found 
to be reasonable in action situations. The actor must weigh up the combined 
institutional inputs and reach a decision on how to act. In this sense, the different 
institutional inputs can reinforce some action plans and counteract or downplay 
others, which may affect aggregate outcomes. If one outcome is preferred, 
the institutional setting may be described as complementary, even though 
different institutions produce reasonable action plans that are counteracting in 
combination. However, counteracting institutions may still indicate a sub-optimal 
institutional setting: that is, if reinforcing institutions were in place, the outcome 
would have been even better. On the other hand, a combination of reinforcing 
institutions may produce non-preferred outcomes. Such an institutional setting 
would perform better if counteracting institutions were put in place.
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6. Swedish institutional reform and hypothesised 
outcomes on turnover cognitions
How might the rapid changes in the Swedish UI in combination with the more 
stable EPL influence employees’ turnover cognitions? Are any combined effects 
expected that would either reinforce or counteract the willingness for job change? 
The theoretical framework above asserts that the institutions may affect the 
cognitions, values and norms that are reasonable in the situation and that these 
combinations may reinforce or counteract certain action plans.
Table 2. Possible influence of EPL and UI in 2006 and 2010 
on employees’ turnover cognitions
2006 2010
EPL
Strict
UI
Generous
EPL
Strict
UI
Less generous
Cognitions
(assessments)
High job security 
(for regular)
Investment in 
EPL is possible
High income 
security 
in case of 
unemployment
High job 
security (for 
regular)
Investment in 
EPL is possible
Low income 
security in case of 
unemployment
Values (goals or 
preferences)
Job security is 
important
Affordable to 
pay UI 
Job security is 
important
Less affordable to 
pay UI 
Norms 
(appropriate 
actions)
Firms should 
behave in 
accordance with 
the spirit of the 
law
(In normal 
cases, employees 
should be loyal to 
employers)
It is appropriate 
to receive 
unemployment 
benefit
Firms should 
behave in 
accordance with 
the spirit of the 
law
(In normal 
cases, employees 
should be loyal 
to employers)
It is less 
appropriate 
to receive 
unemployment 
benefit
⇓ ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Institutional 
reasonable action 
plans concerning 
job change
Investments in 
EPL
Internal mobility
External 
mobility at high 
risk
Investments in 
EPL
Internal mobility
External mobility 
at low risk
Reinforcing or 
counteracting 
action plans
Low incentives for mobility by EPL 
are counteracted by the generous UB
Low incentives for mobility by EPL 
are reinforced by the less generous 
UB
Probable 
outcome on 
aggregate level
Willingness to change employer is, ceteris paribus, lower in 2010 than in 
2006
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Table 2 provides an overview of the reasonable cognitions, values and norms in 
relation to the institutions in question, in both 2006 and 2010. It also shows the 
influence of the institutions on reasonable action plans concerning voluntary job 
mobility and whether the institutions reinforce or counteract certain outcomes. 
Finally, the table shows the hypothesised outcome of the change.
The cognitive aspect of institutions is related to actors’ assessments of the 
situation. In terms of the EPL, it is believed to affect employees’ perceptions of job 
security. As shown above, Swedish legislation is characterized by the opportunity 
to ‘invest’ in protection. Generally speaking, the longer an employee stays in a 
job, the better the job protection. The employment protection legislation did not 
change greatly between 2006 and 2010. Consequently, employees’ cognitions 
concerning job security may not have changed for this reason.
Furthermore, job security is highly evaluated by employees in Sweden. In a 
survey in 2005 by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) over 90 
percent of respondents evaluated job security as an important or very important 
quality in a job (Berglund, 2012: 54). Likewise, in a survey from 2010 (discussed 
in greater detail below) that asked the same question, more than 90 percent of 
respondents regard job security to be important or very important. This value, 
however, seems to be almost universal in ‘wage earner societies’: in a comparison 
of 27 countries, only two showed figures below 90 percent (Berglund, 2009).
The third aspect of the EPL is whether it is governed by specific norms of 
behaviours: that is, internalised opinions about what is appropriate behaviour. 
Firstly, the EPL is a law that, in principle, dictates the behaviour of an employer. 
The most important informal norms that accompany the law may relate to 
employees’ expectations that employers should behave in accordance with the 
spirit of the law. For example, there have been some discussions in Sweden 
concerning whether it is okay to dismiss an employee and then replace him or her 
with a temporary work agency worker. However, there is no systematic research 
on these norms in Sweden that can be used here. Furthermore, normative 
expectations that consider actors other than oneself are not constraining in 
the same way. Are there any normative expectations connected to the EPL that 
may constrain the behaviour of employees? One possibility would be that some 
kind of normative reciprocity develops; that employers’ obligations to follow the 
EPL have a normative correspondence, in that employees should (in normal 
circumstances) be loyal to their employer. 
The UI is believed to influence employees’ assessments of income security in 
case of unemployment. Because of changes to insurance rules, income security is 
believed to have dropped between 2006 and 2010. In terms of how the insurance 
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is evaluated, the loss of members indicates that fewer employees saw the insurance 
as affordable in 2010 than in 2006. There are also signs that the public discourse 
about the unemployment insurance has changed since 2006. The right-wing/
centre government has argued strongly that it is the ‘work strategy’ that is in force 
and that benefits are only to be used as a last resort and for a very short time 
period (Bengtsson and Berglund, 2012).
Bringing these factors together, it is reasonable to presume that the 
employment protection legislation in 2006 and 2010 provides few incentives 
for voluntary mobility. The construction of the law makes it possible to invest 
in job security through tenure, and job security is a value that most Swedes 
regard as important in a job. However, it is less clear whether there are also 
informal norms in work in the Swedish context that regard loyalty rather than 
individual mobility as the correct behaviour for employees. The unemployment 
insurance, on the other hand, has gone through major changes that may affect its 
significance for transitions and job changes. In 2006, the UI was rather generous 
and most employees felt it was affordable to pay the fees. Furthermore, the public 
discourse did not to the same degree problematize the use of unemployment 
benefits in the case of unemployment. In this way, the insurance provided 
support for the risky behaviour of changing a job. If a new job turned out to be 
less secure, the insurance compensated somewhat for a failed transition. In 2010, 
however, the situation changed dramatically. The UI now gives less protection in 
the case of unemployment and many employees have left the UI, feeling that it 
is not affordable. Moreover, public discourse is less indulgent regarding the use 
of benefits – the so-called work strategy has been propagated (Bengtsson and 
Berglund, 2012).
Looking at the EPL and the UI in combination, the low incentives for 
mobility in the EPL in 2006 are counteracted by the relatively generous UI. In 
2010, however, the low incentives by the EPL were instead reinforced by the less 
generous UI. This leads to the expectation that turnover cognitions are, ceteris 
paribus, lower in 2010 than 2006.
7. Data and method
The data used in this paper is based on two postal surveys; one conducted in autumn 
2006 and the other in autumn 2010. Both samples used the ordinary labour force 
survey (LFS) as a sample frame, which has two advantages. Firstly, the sample 
can be aimed at specific groups in the labour market; the present study targeted 
employees aged 16 to 64. Secondly, the variables included in the ordinary labour 
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force survey can be used, which provides detailed information about the labour 
market situation of the respondents, in addition to the questionnaire. The response 
rates for the surveys were 52 percent in 2006 (1851 responses) and 54 percent in 
2010 (2023 responses). In the analyses the two data sets have been merged.
The central dependent variable for the analyses is an indicator of turnover 
cognitions. The 2010 study asked employees the following question: ‘Do you 
presently want to change employer/workplace?’ The possible answers were ‘Yes’, 
‘Maybe’ or ‘No’. However, the 2006 study used three questions to study mobility 
cognitions: (1) ‘Do you presently want to change both employer and workplace?’ 
(2) ‘Do you presently want to change employer but not workplace?’ (3) ‘Do you 
presently want to change workplace but not employer?’ The same answering 
alternatives were used, except for the last question, which had an additional 
alternative: ‘There is only one workplace’.
To create comparable measures for 2006 and 2010, only the first and third 
questions in the 2006 study were used. An answer of ‘yes’ to the 2010 question 
or to the first or the third 2006 questions indicates turnover cognitions. This 
construction may overestimate the mobility cognitions in 2006 to some degree. 
The direct question of changing workplace but not employer may make this 
alternative more salient than using a slash between employer and workplace. 
However, using only the first alternative in the 2006 study (‘both employer and 
workplace’) is too strict.
Two other variables are used as both dependent and independent variables 
in the analyses. The first is related to the significance of job security for mobility. 
Both questionnaires asked the following question: ‘How do the following factors 
in your present workplace affect your will to stay or change employer/workplace?’ 
Several aspects of the work situation were then listed, one of which was ‘My job 
security’. The answer options were: ‘It contributes strongly/somewhat to my will 
to stay’, ‘It has no significance’ or ‘It contributes strongly/somewhat to my will to 
change’. Going back to the theoretical reasoning above, the relative value of job 
security is expected to increase when job mobility is more hazardous because of 
a less generous UI since 2006. Another factor related to the greater risk involved 
in external mobility is the relative value of internal mobility, which should have 
been higher in 2010 than in 2006. The questionnaires also asked if ‘My career 
prospects’ contributed to the will to stay or change employer/workplace. In the 
present context it will work as a proxy for internal mobility intentions.
The strategy for investigating the hypothesis of reduced turnover cognitions 
between 2006 and 2010 is to make a dummy variable for the year and use it 
in a multiple regression and control for as many additional factors as possible 
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that may affect the willingness to change job. The analyses used several variables 
as controls (see the Appendix). However, in relation to earlier research and the 
analytical purpose of the paper, there are also some key variables.
The first variable is ‘Year’, which consists of 2006 and 2010. In many ways, 
this variable is a ‘black box’, as it contains every non-measured aspect of the 
situation for employees in the two years. One of these factors is the difference in 
the institutional systems of EPL and UI. Another factor that may be contained 
in the variable, however, is a general change in the perceptions of job chances 
and job security due to the job crises that unfolded in Sweden in the autumn of 
2008. In 2006, the unemployment level in Sweden was 7.1 (Statistics Sweden 
database). For 2008 as a whole, the unemployment level dropped to 6.1 percent. 
In 2009, however, it suddenly increased to 8.4 percent and continued at this 
level in 2010. A change in the business cycle usually has a de facto effect on job 
mobility (Furåker and Berglund, 2009) and turnover cognitions (Sousa-Poza 
and Henneberger, 2004) in a pro-cyclical direction. Therefore, it is of central 
importance to control for factors that indicate changes in the labour market 
situation. 
Three variables are used for this purpose. The first is a question about the 
significance of different factors for external job mobility prospects. One of the 
listed factors was ‘the situation in my local labour market’, with five alternative 
answers ranging from ‘not at all limiting’ to ‘greatly limiting’. A second variable 
is a question about the risk of losing one’s job: ‘If there were reductions in your 
workplace, how do you assess the risk of being one of the first to be let go?’ The 
answers had a five-point scale from ‘very large’ to ‘very small’. The third variable 
is changes in the unemployment rate at the county level (Swedish ‘Län’) between 
the year of the survey and the year before. The use of this variable follows the 
findings of Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2004), who showed that turnover 
cognitions are affected by changes in the unemployment rate rather than the 
absolute level.
Two other variables of central concern are job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment, both of which have been shown to be central antecedents of 
turnover cognitions (Tett and Meyer 1993). The indicator of job satisfaction 
is a five-point scale for how satisfied or dissatisfied the employee is with their 
job overall (ranging from ‘very satisfied’ to ‘very dissatisfied’). Organisational 
commitment is measured (on a five-point scale from ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’) by a 
single statement about how proud the employee is of his or her organisation/
workplace.
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The analyses below have used logistic regression to estimate the effects of 
the independent variables. The first two analyses focus on the factors that affect 
employees’ views on the significance of job security and career possibilities 
for their will to stay at the employer. These models have a more extensive and 
exploratory nature, including all controls to find those factors that are important. 
The models in the analyses of turnover cognitions are more parsimonious and 
consist of several steps. In the first analysis, the effect of year is shown together 
with age, education and sector of employment, which are the variables left of 
the controls with substantial effects on turnover cognitions. The following three 
models show the separate effects of the variables measuring the labour market 
situation (Model 2), job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Model 
3) and job security and career prospects (Model 4). The last model (Model 5) 
analyses all the variables together.
8. Results
The first step focuses on the two questions about the significance of job security 
and career prospects on the willingness to stay at one’s present workplace. 
The distributions in Table 3 show that job security and career prospects both 
seemed to be more important in 2010 than in 2006. In particular, a much larger 
proportion of people consider job security important for their will to stay. 
Table 3. Distributions on the question ‘How do the following factors in your 
present workplace affect your will to stay or change employer/workplace?’ 
regarding job security and career prospects in 2006 and 2010. Percent. 
Contributes to 
my will to stay No significance
Contributes to my 
will to change Total (n)
My job security
2006 42.9 48.8 8.3 100 (1797)
2010 63.1 30.0 6.9 100 (1977)
My possibilities for a career
2006 18.3 58.6 23.1 100 (1798)
2010 25.7 55.1 19.2 100 (1976)
Do these results hold when controlling for different factors, especially the 
perceptions of the labour market situation in 2006 and 2010? Table 4 shows 
the logarithmic odds ratios that job security and, respectively, career prospects 
contribute to employees’ willingness to stay at the workplace. The odds for the 
opinions were higher in 2010 than 2006, even when many potential factors are 
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controlled in the model. It is particularly important to underline the variables 
indicating the employment situation in the labour market. The conclusion of 
these analyses is that there are indications that employees were more hesitant in 
2010 to risk job security and place greater value on the opportunities to advance 
inside the organisation than in 2006.
Table 4. Logistic regression coefficients for job security and career prospects 
to contribute to employees’ willingness to stay with their present employer
Variables Job security Career possibilities 
Year (2006=0; 2010=1) 0.948*** 0.539***
Gender (Male=0; Female=1) 0.187* -0.084
Age category (0=55-64)
16-24 -0.459+ 0.830**
25-34 -0.484** 1.084***
35-44 -0.546*** 0.619***
45-54 -0.335** 0.348*
Civil status (0=Married)
Cohabitant -0.007 -0.084
Single -0.007 -0.209
Children living at home (No=0; Yes=1) -0.156 -0.146
Educational level (0=Tertiary)
Primary 0.511** 0.453*
Secondary 0.418*** 0.271*
Socio-economic category 
(0=Higher white collar)
Non-skilled worker -0.095 -0.792***
Skilled worker 0.107 -0.383*
Lower white collar 0.046 -0.275
Middle white collar 0.018 -0.101
Monthly wage (5000 SEK increments) -0.051 0.156***
Working time (0=35 hours and more) 
1-19 -0.552+ -0.606
20-34 -0.273* -0.145
Contract (Permanent=0; Temporary=1) -1.484*** 0.291
Sector of employment 
(Private=0; Public=1)
0.136 -0.060
No of employees (0=500 and more)
1-10 -0.646*** -0.184
11-19 -0.431** -0.388*
20-49 -0.441** -0.178
50-99 -0.405** -0.161
100-499 -0.123 -0.056
Union member (Yes=0; No=1) -0.449*** 0.058
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Variables Job security Career possibilities 
Local labour market limits possibilities to change to a 
similar or better job (five-point scale, more restricting)
0.070* -0.065+
If there were reductions in your workplace, how do you 
assess the risk of being one of the first to be let go?
(five-grade scale, less risk)
0.249*** 0.045
Change in unemployment level (percent) 0.067 -0.177*
Job satisfaction
(five-point scale, less satisfied)
-0.221*** -0.517***
Proud of organisation
(five-point scale, less proud)
-0.137** -0.454***
Constant 0.105 -0.480
Nagelkerke R2 0.225 0.204
n 3059 3059
Levels of significance: +:p<0.10;*:p< 0.05; **: p< 0.01; ***: p< 0.001
Table 5 presents the distributions concerning the willingness to change 
employer/workplace and provides a clear indication of decreasing turnover 
cognitions. As underlined above, it is important to note that the questions used to 
measure turnover cognitions are not fully compatible. However, using the more 
restricted definition in 2006, the figures still indicate a higher level of willingness 
to change jobs (16.9 percent).
Table 5. Desire to change employer/workplace in 2006 and 2010. Percent. 
Year Yes Maybe/No Total (n)
2006 20.7 79.3 100 (1805)
2010 14.7 85.3 100 (1991)
Table 6. Logistic regression coefficients for employees’ turnover cognitions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Year (2006=0; 2010=1) -0.366*** -0.301*
Age category (0=55-64)
16-24 1.658*** 1.610***
25-34 1.282*** 1.283***
35-44 0.984*** 1.044***
45-54 0.664*** 0.688***
Educational level 
(0=Tertiary)
Primary -0.071 -0.531*
Secondary -0.166 -0.398**
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Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Sector of employment 
(Private=0; Public=1)
-0.179+ -0.249*
Local labour market limit 
possibilities to change to a 
similar or better job (five-
point scale, more restricting)
0.065+ 0.039
If there were reductions in 
your workplace, how do you 
assess the risk of being one of 
the first to be let go?
(five-grade scale, less risk)
-0.237*** -0.075+
Change in unemployment 
level (percent)
-0.181** -0.126
Job satisfaction
(five-point scale, less satisfied)
1.172*** 1.130***
Proud of organisation
(five-point scale, less proud)
0.443*** 0.460***
Job security 
(go/no signif.=0; stay=1)
-0.704*** -0.296*
Career possibilities 
(go/no signif.=0; stay=1)
-0.835*** -0.311+
Constant -2.020*** -0.913*** -5.381*** 0.513* -4.823***
Nagelkerke R2 0.063 0.033 0.290 0.058 0.351
n 3194
Levels of significance: +:p<0.10;*:p< 0.05; **: p< 0.01; ***: p< 0.001
The analysis in Table 6 is restricted to the most important factors explaining 
turnover cognitions. In line with other research (Tett and Meyer, 1993), job 
satisfaction and organisational commitment have strong effects (Model 3). 
There are significant effects of the labour market situation (Model 2) and the two 
variables measuring the importance of job security and career prospects to stay at 
the employer (Model 4). Year is significant in Model 1, along with age (younger 
people have more turnover cognitions). In Model 5, when all the variables are 
included, the effect of year is still statistically significant (that is, employees had 
fewer turnover cognitions in 2010 than in 2006). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that there is a difference between the years that are unique, and different from 
changes in other important factors, such as the indicators of the labour market 
situation included in the model.
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9. Conclusions
Sweden’s unemployment insurance underwent significant changes in 2007. 
It became much less generous: stricter work requirements, more waiting days, 
greater demands of increased search activity, lower compensation rate, no increase 
in the level of the ‘ceiling’ despite income increases, and higher membership fees. 
At the same time, there were only minor changes in the employment protection 
legislation: the options for using temporary employees were further liberalised.
This paper has investigated how this change in the combination of UI 
and EPL has influenced the willingness of employees to make job transitions. 
Institutional theories, particularly theories of institutional complementarities, 
assert that it is hard to predict the specific outcome of an institutional change 
because institutions may have interaction effects on actors. If changes take 
place at one institution without considering complementary institutions, any 
reinforcing or compensational effects may change or disappear.
The article has argued that the combination of a strict EPL and a generous UI 
in 2006 was complementary in terms of external mobility intentions. A strict EPL 
may make employees less prone to external mobility. This can be counteracted 
to some degree by a generous UI, which is believed to make employees more 
inclined to risky transitions. The institutional setting was different in 2010, as the 
strict EPL was combined with a less generous UI. This combination reinforces 
non-mobility intentions, in the sense that it is better for employees to hold on to 
what they have, invest in job protection through tenure and try to improve their 
situation through internal mobility. This combination is not complementary in 
relation to mobility but to stability (which can be a desirable outcome in the 
labour market (see Jonsson, 2007)).
The empirical findings support this prediction. In 2010, a larger share of 
employees than in 2006 supported the notions that job security and career 
prospects at their workplace contribute to their desire to stay. These results are 
probably not the result of improvements in these regards at the organisations. A 
more plausible interpretation is that employees’ evaluations of these facets have 
changed; job security and internal career prospects exert a stronger restraining 
force on employees, and they are less prepared to risk them (through external 
mobility, for example). Furthermore, a smaller proportion of employees wanted 
to change employers in 2010 than in 2006. These findings point toward reduced 
willingness for external mobility.
What caused the different perceptions in 2006 and 2010? The regression 
analyses used year as an independent variable. However, this variable can be 
regarded as a ‘black box’ that contains all non-measured aspects of the situation. 
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The strategy then was to control for as many factors as possible, thereby 
ruling out alternative explanations for the effect of year and retaining only the 
significance of the institutional change. Apart from factors that could be related 
to the composition of the sample (such as the age distribution) and subjective 
assessment of the risk of being dismissed, the analysis included the situation 
in the local labour market, as well as changes in the unemployment rate at the 
county level. These last factors are of particular importance. A major event, in 
addition to the changes in the UI, is the economic crisis that started to unfold in 
the autumn of 2008. The inclusion of these variables hopefully catches some of 
the subjective concern and insecurity that the crisis may have caused.
This analytical strategy does not rule out every alternative explanation for the 
‘unique’ effect of year. Sweden’s right-wing/centre government also introduced 
other institutional changes, such as a tax reform that cut taxes for people in 
employment but not for people who were not working, including the unemployed. 
There is also the possibility that the crisis disrupted people’s feelings of security 
on a more fundamental level, which the questionnaire variables did not capture, 
making them more risk averse. Furthermore, there is also the possibility of 
interaction effects, such as the combination of the UI reforms and the crisis.
Taking these alternative explanations into consideration, the UI reform must 
still be regarded as a major change in the institutional setting of the Swedish 
labour market. Following institutional theory, the reform had a fundamental 
impact in terms of changing the ‘rules of the game’. The focus of the reformers 
was to increase the incentives for the unemployed to search for and accept 
jobs. But there was also a second purpose: making the UI more like normal 
insurance by letting the fees mirror unemployment should hold back unions’ 
wage demands in sectors with high unemployment (see Finanspolitiska rådet, 
2011: 238ff ). However, this study has shown that the reforms may have had 
unintended side effects on employees in terms of making them more risk-averse, 
thereby hindering external mobility in the labour market.
Is this a serious side effect in the Swedish context? Two studies on mobility 
in the Swedish labour market have revealed low figures. The first of these studied 
job-to-job mobility between 1972 and 1998 (Furåker and Berglund, 2009). 
Before the 1990s crisis in Sweden, approximately 10 percent of employees 
changed employer every year. During the crisis, this number fell to around six 
or seven percent, but recovered in the last year of the series to eight percent. A 
later study of job-to-job mobility between 2000 and 2004 revealed an average of 
7.9 percent (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010). This study also found a large 
difference between four Nordic countries. The average job-to-job mobility was 
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15.7 percent in Denmark, 11.1 percent in Finland and 14.0 percent in Norway. 
In comparison, the Swedish figures are much lower. However, the decreasing 
external mobility intentions shown in the above analyses are not promising 
in this regard. As noted above, studies have shown quite strong correlations 
between turnover cognitions and de facto job quits (Griffeth et alii, 2000; Hom 
and Kinicki, 2001).
Table 7. Institutional combinations of EPL 
and UI and expected mobility outcomes
Mobility Outcome
Effect of 
institutional 
combination of 
EPL and UI
Reinforcing 
++
Danish flexicurity:
Liberal EPL / Generous UI
--
Sweden 2010:
Strict EPL / Ungenerous UI
Counteracting 
+
US:
Liberal EPL / Ungenerous UI
-
Sweden 2006:
Strict EPL / Generous UI
Referring back to the more theoretical questions of institutional 
complementarities, Table 7 provides an overview of the possible effects of 
combining EPL and UI. As the present analysis has argued, Sweden in 2006 had 
a combination of counteracting institutions, which gave employees incentives for 
both mobility and non-mobility. If willingness for mobility among employees 
is considered to be positive for society (or the economy), the generous UI can 
be said to have compensated for the strict EPL. From this perspective, the 
combination can be regarded as complementary in terms of keeping up mobility 
intentions. In 2010, the situation changed in Sweden; now the institutional 
combination can be described as reinforcing. However, it is not reinforcing in 
the presumed positive direction, producing incentives for mobility. Instead, the 
analysis points towards incentives for non-mobility: that is, the less generous UI 
reinforces the incentives of non-mobility by the strict EPL. From this point of 
view, the institutional combination of EPL and UI in 2010 cannot be said to be 
complementary.
If Swedish politics suddenly defines low mobility figures as a problem and 
decides that this is caused by the EPL and the UI, which direction are reforms 
likely to take? The most probable direction is a return to a more generous UI. 
From a theoretical point of view, there are other alternatives. One could be 
the Danish flexicurity road, combining a liberal EPL with generous UI, which 
evidently reinforces mobility (see Jørgensen and Madsen, 2007; Nordic Council 
of Ministers, 2010; Berglund and Furåker, 2011). However, this direction may 
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be less likely because it involves a more fundamental change in the institutional 
setup that affects both the EPL and the UI. Another option is the American way, 
which combines a liberal EPL with an ungenerous UI. Mobility figures in the 
US are also relatively high (e.g., Jolivet et alii, 2006). However, it is important to 
note that other factors may encourage mobility in the American context, such 
as large wage dispersion. A Swedish institutional change in this direction would 
only involve liberalisation of the EPL. However, it would also entail a direct 
confrontation with the Swedish unions, especially LO, which the government 
has avoided so far. Since the changes to the UI, the Swedish unions have been 
weakened and there have been serious discussions about leaving the Ghent 
system and introducing an obligatory unemployment insurance. This would 
most certainly be a new blow to the union rate.
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